Episode AI notes
- The unique cognitive and social capabilities of humans are intertwined and developed through social interaction.
- Control conditions are important in experimental design to ensure reliable results even when studying different species.
- Humans and chimpanzees share the ability to quantify, but humans’ unique cognitive and social abilities set us apart.
- Humans’ ability to collaborate and communicate with others distinguishes us as a species.
- Human cognitive development is dependent on social interaction rather than individual brain power.
- Biological factors contribute to human behavior and cognition, such as the presence of biological components in raising a chimp as a human.
- Language acquisition and perspective-taking are deeply affected by children’s interaction with others.
- Humans have a unique ability to view the same item from different perspectives, allowing for symbolic thinking and manipulation of concepts.
- The evolution from bipedal apes to tool-wielding humans occurred over six million years.
- The coordination and collaboration of different perspectives and decisions are crucial in communication and collaboration.
- Infants display joint attention, which leads to the development of shared mental states and knowledge.
- The development of language in humans is preceded by the use of gestures and non-verbal communication.
- The extended period of dependency in human youngsters allows for learning, social coordination, and cultural integration.
- Accumulated knowledge and cultural transmission play a significant role in human survival and development.
- Morality is a delicate balance between self-preservation and consideration for others.
- Humans help each other in interdependent social networks to promote their own genetic fitness.
- Food and interdependence are crucial elements in the evolution of humans.
- Morality in humans has evolved based on interdependent cooperation. (Time 0:00:00)
Studying the Similarities and Differences Between Human Beings and Apes The work involves studying the differences between human beings and other great apes. This includes studying children in development as well as apes. The methodology for studying them is different and the researcher is often surprised by the similarities or differences found. People are generally interested in understanding the similarities and differences between humans and animals, making it an inherently interesting topic. The methodology initially involved conducting separate studies with kids and chimpanzees, starting with gestural communication and looking for similarities between kids’ gestures and those of chimps. Transcript: Speaker 2 Yeah. And thank you. One of the things I love about your work is that you’re interested in the differences between human beings and other great apes. And therefore you study both. You study children in development and also apes. And so tell us a little bit about the methodology of doing those things. I presume it’s very different. And are you ever like very surprised by similarities or differences that you find? Speaker 1 Well I think one of the reasons that people find the work interesting is because we’re always thinking about how we’re similar to animals and how we’re different. The ancient Greeks already thought like that. And I know from talking to non-academic friends and stuff, people find it interesting what a chimps do that’s similar to us. What do they do that’s different? So I think it’s kind of inherently interesting. So that makes it a little bit easy to sell. So in terms of methodology, it sort of started out where we would do a study with kids and we’d say, well let’s try it with chimps also. And there would be two different studies. And we started with gestural communication and we looked at chimps for things that look like kids’ gestures, like maybe pointing or something like that. (Time 0:04:37)
Cooperative Information Sharing and Language Motivation Humans share information cooperatively with the motivation to benefit others and engage in casual sharing and gossip, which taps into different social cognitive mechanisms and deeper motivations underlying language. Language is an outgrowth of shared intentionality. Designing studies with similar methods and including control conditions are crucial, as they ensure the scientific rigor necessary for valid experimentation and research, despite criticism on exact method replication. Transcript: Speaker 1 We share information with one another cooperatively in a way that other apes don’t. I tell you stuff for your benefit. I share stuff with you just to share it, just gossiping and whatnot. So there are different social cognitive mechanisms, different motivations underlying language that are much deeper. And that’s where I get to the shared intentionality business and language is an outgrowth of that. So anyway, the whole point of going off on that little tangent was to say that those people, I knew they would criticize the experiments for not having exactly the same methods because They can’t be exactly the same. And so every time we design one of those studies, we did our very best to make them the same. And then in addition, we had control conditions. And this is really important because some of the, I mean, control conditions are a basic part of science from introductory class on scientific methods. But Christoph Bosch in particular, who’s not an experimentalist but as a field worker, has never appreciated. For example, people say, well, you know, there’s a human experimenter and that matches the species of the children and it’s a different species for the chimps. (Time 0:07:34)
Importance of Control Conditions in Experimental Design Control conditions are crucial in experimental design to ensure that any observed effects are due to the manipulated variables and not external factors. Even in studies involving different species, maintaining consistent control conditions is essential for reliable results. For example, using the same human experimenter across control and experimental conditions helps eliminate potential confounding variables. Transcript: Speaker 1 And so every time we design one of those studies, we did our very best to make them the same. And then in addition, we had control conditions. And this is really important because some of the, I mean, control conditions are a basic part of science from introductory class on scientific methods. But Christoph Bosch in particular, who’s not an experimentalist but as a field worker, has never appreciated. For example, people say, well, you know, there’s a human experimenter and that matches the species of the children and it’s a different species for the chimps. But we might do a study where we’re going to hide some food from the chimps and we kind of maybe lift it up a little bit or we do something and then they find it. But then we point to it, this is one of the places where they surprisingly fail, and we point to it like this and they don’t find it. Well, the human experimenter was the same in both the control condition and the experimental condition. So if it was going to affect it, it would affect them in both. (Time 0:08:16)
The Uniqueness of Human Cognitive and Social Capabilities The unique cognitive capabilities of humans are evidenced by our creation and utilization of technology, language, social institutions, universities, governments, and mathematics. However, it is argued that our distinctive cognitive abilities are intimately intertwined with our unique social abilities, as shown by the thought experiment of a child on a desert island growing up without any other human beings and the question of what mathematics they would invent. Transcript: Speaker 2 We’re always slightly amazed when we find other primates showing empathy or altruism or something like that that we think about as quintessentially human, and we emphasize the similarity There. But in some sense, there is something obviously different. There are no chimpanzees who have podcasts or who use laptop computers. So there’s clearly a question to be addressed here, right? Speaker 1 Every species, by definition, every species is unique in some way. Right? That’s not saying anything. And humans would seem, obviously, we have skyscrapers and podcasts and computers and language and social institutions and universities and governments and mathematics. And so we are clearly what makes us different is clearly some kind of cognitive thing. But at the same time, part of my shtick has been that the really unique cognitive part is intimately mowed up with the unique social part that what we do is put our heads together with others. And from my very earliest things, I’ve used the thought experiment of the child on a desert island who grows up without any other human beings from birth with no other human beings, what Mathematics would they invent? (Time 0:10:50)
The Unique Cognitive and Social Aspects of Humans Transcript: Michael Tomasello Species, by definition, every species is unique in some way, right? That’s why we’re not saying anything. And humans would seem obviously, you know, we have skyscrapers and podcasts and computers and language and social institutions and universities and governments and mathematics. And so, you know, we are clearly what makes us different is clearly some kind of cognitive thing. But at the same time, part of my shtick has been that the really unique cognitive part is intimately bound up with the unique social part. That what we do is put our heads together with others. And I’ve, from my very earliest things, I’ve used the, the thought experiment of the child on a desert island who grows up without any other human beings from birth with no other human Beings, you know, what mathematics would they invent? I feel like they would do pretty much what chimps would do, right? So chimps can already quantify things and tell which one has more and things like that. What would you invent on your own beyond that? Well, maybe little, I don’t know what, but certainly not algebra, let’s put it that way. And would you invent a language by yourself? That makes no sense. There’s nobody to talk to. You wouldn’t invent a language by yourself and you certainly wouldn’t invent a social institution or any of this complexity by yourself. So (Time 0:11:14)
Seres humanos coevolucionan con la cultura que crean. Transcript: Michael Tomasello Species, by definition, every species is unique in some way, right? That’s why we’re not saying anything. And humans would seem obviously, you know, we have skyscrapers and podcasts and computers and language and social institutions and universities and governments and mathematics. And so, you know, we are clearly what makes us different is clearly some kind of cognitive thing. But at the same time, part of my shtick has been that the really unique cognitive part is intimately bound up with the unique social part. That what we do is put our heads together with others. And I’ve, from my very earliest things, I’ve used the, the thought experiment of the child on a desert island who grows up without any other human beings from birth with no other human Beings, you know, what mathematics would they invent? I feel like they would do pretty much what chimps would do, right? So chimps can already quantify things and tell which one has more and things like that. What would you invent on your own beyond that? Well, maybe little, I don’t know what, but certainly not algebra, let’s put it that way. And would you invent a language by yourself? That makes no sense. There’s nobody to talk to. You wouldn’t invent a language by yourself and you certainly wouldn’t invent a social institution or any of this complexity by yourself. So this is the key diagnostic feature is that humans are not doing this on based on individual brain power. They are adapted to leverage, to use that metaphor, to, you know, what other people know and collaborating with others and communicating with others and socially learning from others. And of course, culture is built up to actually teach others. And so that’s really the difference. So if you, you know, if you raised a chimp on a desert island and a kid on a desert island, they wouldn’t end up that different. But humans are adapted. But then you raise a chimp in a human culture, which people have done in various ways. And they maybe are a little bit different, but they’re pretty much still chimps. And kids in a culture are doing all these human-like things. Sean Carroll So (Time 0:11:14)
coevolución cultura homo_sapiens
Biological Basis of Human Behavior and Cognition The speaker discusses the biological aspect of human behavior, emphasizing that biological factors contribute to human cognition and behavior. They highlight the presence of biological components in raising a chimp as a human and draw a connection to autism, pointing out missing elements in autism that they are focusing on. The speaker acknowledges the complexity of autism as a spectrum but emphasizes the importance of understanding the nuances, ultimately expressing confidence in humanity’s ability to understand the ultimate laws of physics due to a phase transition in human cognition allowing manipulation of symbols and abstraction. Transcript: Speaker 2 And clearly, there has to be something biological there also, because like you say, you can’t bring the chimp into a house and raise it, and it’ll just be human. Speaker 1 That’s correct. So good. So our quest is clearly defined now. We want to figure out. And if you want another indication of the biological part of it is you have children with autism is the syndrome. They tend to be missing exactly the things that I’m trying that I’m zeroing in on. Right. Speaker 2 Of course, autism is very complicated because it is a spectrum and you get people very in it. So that, but it is a good thing to point out the weekend that you ultimately, there are both the differences and we’re both suffused with commonalities. And that’s okay. We want to get exactly the nuances right. That’s correct. So okay then. You know, I’ve often in my simplistic physicist way been asked, you know, is it possible that human beings would ever be able to understand the ultimate laws of physics? And I have a line for that, but you’re the right person to ask whether my line is at all right, which is that we did undergo some kind of phase transition in human cognition where we can manipulate Symbols. And I almost want to say it’s like going from a primitive computer to a touring machine where we’ve reached a level of abstraction where, yeah, I don’t see any obstacles to us figuring Out everything eventually. (Time 0:14:08)
Language Acquisition and Perspective Taking in Child Development Children’s ability to learn language is deeply affected by their interaction with others. The brain has evolved for language acquisition in interaction with others, and the ability to take others’ perspectives is crucial. This perspective-taking allows individuals to attribute different meanings to the same object, showing flexibility in understanding and language use. Transcript: Speaker 1 I agree with that, but I would say that your child on a desert island, they’re not going to learn a language, right? There is no language to learn. There’s nobody to communicate with. Are they going to be similar symbol manipulators like that? Right, okay. So the brain has evolved to do all of that in interaction with others. And I think getting other people’s other people disagreeing with you and you having to take their perspective leads us to one of the things that I think is taken for granted in much of Adult cognitive science is that we can look at an object and say, you know, that’s a dog, that’s an animal. It’s a thing. It’s a pet. No problem. Call it whatever you, you know, whatever’s appropriate. Well, I don’t think other creatures really have that kind of flexibility that the same exact item can be looked at from different points of view. And we all know from a certain age children know, maybe little children don’t, really little ones, but from a certain age, we know, oh, it’s just how matter of how you look at it. (Time 0:15:38)
Desarrollo de capacidades cognitivas superiores se construye sobre herramientas semióticas Transcript: Michael Tomasello The brain has evolved to do all of that in interaction with others. And I think, you know, getting other people’s, other people disagreeing with you and you having to take their perspective leads us to one of the things that I think is taken for granted In much of adult cognitive science is that we can look at an object and say, you know, that’s a dog, that’s an animal, it’s a thing, it’s a pet, no problem, call it whatever you, you know, Whatever’s appropriate. Well, I don’t think other creatures really have that kind of flexibility, that the same exact item can be looked at from different points of view. And we all know from a certain age, children know, maybe little children don’t, really little ones, but from a certain age, we know it’s just a matter of how you look at it. So we have all this flexibility. I’ve even talked about perspectival cognitive representations. And I think symbolic, the way you’re thinking about it, the way a lot of people are thinking about it, is of that nature. When you mean symbolic, you mean a symbol for animal or a single symbol for dog or a symbol for pet. And it’s not about the world. It’s about our conceptualization of the world. And then we can manipulate those in all kinds of ways. So I think the evolution of the species was to be able to do this in interaction with others. And then I actually start my book on the evolution of human thinking with a metaphor. I say, it seems like thinking is something in the privacy of your own mind. And it is, but it’s like a jazz musician playing a jazz rift in his apartment by himself. Yes, he’s doing it by himself, but he learned jazz from other people, and the instrument was built by other people over many years, perfected, and he’s playing in the genre that was invented By other people before him. So yes, we end up doing all this thinking and symbol manipulation, but if you look at the evolutionary and cultural history, the individual is growing up and being assimilated into That. And that’s an essential part of the process also. So (Time 0:15:53)
coevolución cognición cultura desarrollo homo_sapiens
The Flexibility of Human Thinking: A Discussion on Perspectival Cognitive Representations and Symbolic Conceptualization Transcript: Michael Tomasello I don’t think other creatures really have that kind of flexibility, that the same exact item can be looked at from different points of view. And we all know from a certain age, children know, maybe little children don’t, really little ones, but from a certain age, we know it’s just a matter of how you look at it. So we have all this flexibility. I’ve even talked about perspectival cognitive representations. And I think symbolic, the way you’re thinking about it, the way a lot of people are thinking about it, is of that nature. When you mean symbolic, you mean a symbol for animal or a single symbol for dog or a symbol for pet. And it’s not about the world. It’s about our conceptualization of the world. And then we can manipulate those in all kinds of ways. So I think the evolution of the species was to be able to do this in interaction with others. And then I actually start my book on the evolution of human thinking with a metaphor. I say, it seems like thinking is something in the privacy of your own mind. And it is, but it’s like a jazz musician playing a jazz rift in his apartment by himself. Yes, he’s doing it by himself, but he learned jazz from other people, and the instrument was built by other people over many years, perfected, and he’s (Time 0:16:24)
Hominin Evolutionary Transition Around six million years ago, the line leading to humans started diverging from other great apes, but it was only about two to three million years ago that they could be classified as Homo. For the first four million years, humans were basically bipedal apes, with the transition to the Homo classification occurring at around two to three million years ago. Transcript: Speaker 2 So you mentioned that around six million years ago is when we diverged Homo sapiens. Well, I guess genus Homo, should I say, from… Genus Homo, yes, correct. The other great apes. Speaker 1 What can we say? Actually, when genus Homo, sorry, I’m correct. That’s when hominins, that’s the line leading to humans started. But it’s only about two to three million years ago that we want to call them Homo. So they were Australopithecines and things back at six million years. I knew there was a very small chance I was going to get that right. Thank you for getting it right. Speaker 2 So what can we confidently say then about where in this evolutionary trajectory this little transition happened? Do we know what that is? Speaker 1 It’s a fascinating question. So let’s take the six million years from what we can tell from the fossil record for the first four million years, or some people might say more like three or three and a half, but somewhere More than half, we were basically bipedal apes. (Time 0:18:12)
The Evolution of Bipedal Apes and Tool Use Transcript: Speaker 1 It’s a fascinating question. So let’s take the six million years from what we can tell from the fossil record for the first four million years, or some people might say more like three or three and a half, but somewhere More than half, we were basically bipedal apes. We were four feet tall, four and a half feet tall, our brains were the size of apes. And we just happened to walk on the two legs, but there was nothing that seemed to be different at all. Then two, two and a half million years ago, you start getting these stone tools, but they’re not very sophisticated, right? And chimps already use stones to crack open nuts. They don’t fashion the stones, but they know how to use stones. And so you start getting something new. And then two million years ago, you start getting a little brain growth. It looks like a little bump there and you’re getting this tool used stuff. So it’s two million years. I think you can sort of zero in on part of it, but if you take this social cultural hypothesis seriously and you look at the tools, it’s really less than a million years. A million years ago, that you get something that looks like a collaborative foraging, collaborative hunting, for example, which I think was a key transition point. (Time 0:18:53)
La transición sociocultural empezó hace un millón de años. Transcript: Michael Tomasello A fascinating question. And in that—all right, so let’s take the six million years. Yeah. From what we can tell from the fossil record for the first four million years, or some people might say more like three or three and a half, but somewhere more than half. We were basically bipedal apes. All right. We were four, four feet tall, four and a half feet tall. Our brains were the size of apes. And we just happened to walk on the two legs, but there was nothing that seemed to be different at all. Then two, two and a half million years ago, you start getting these stone tools, but they’re not very sophisticated, right? And chimps already use stones to crack open nuts. They don’t fashion the stones, but they know how to use stones. Yep. And so you start getting something new. And then two million years ago, you start getting a little brain growth. It looks like a little bump there and you’re getting this tool use stuff. So it’s two million years. I think you can sort of zero in on part of it. But if you take this social cultural hypothesis seriously, and you look at the tools, it’s really less than a million years ago that you get something that looks like collaborative Foraging, collaborative hunting, for example, which I think was a key transition point. And so that’s less than a million years ago, perhaps even a half a million years ago, if you allow group scavenging and stuff like that. And then – so that’s half a million years ago. And then maybe 100 to 200,000 years ago, very recently, that’s Homo sapiens sapiens. And there’s where you get the idea of really cultural groups and where different groups have different tools. And that’s the time where you might expect to see a conventional language and things like that. So the answer to your question is, when did it happen, is I’m of the view that it was fairly late. And out of the six million years humans have been on their own trajectory, in the last million where something really different happened. And I (Time 0:18:53)
Evolution of Bipedal Apes to Homo Sapiens Sapiens The evolution of bipedal apes into Homo sapiens sapiens took six million years. For the first four million years, we were basically bipedal apes with small brains. Two million years ago, stone tools and slight brain growth appeared. Less than a million years ago, collaborative foraging and hunting emerged, possibly as recent as 100 to 200,000 years ago with Homo sapiens sapiens, where cultural groups with different tools and conventional language might have developed. Transcript: Speaker 1 It’s a fascinating question. So let’s take the six million years from what we can tell from the fossil record for the first four million years, or some people might say more like three or three and a half, but somewhere More than half, we were basically bipedal apes. We were four feet tall, four and a half feet tall, our brains were the size of apes. And we just happened to walk on the two legs, but there was nothing that seemed to be different at all. Then two, two and a half million years ago, you start getting these stone tools, but they’re not very sophisticated, right? And chimps already use stones to crack open nuts. They don’t fashion the stones, but they know how to use stones. And so you start getting something new. And then two million years ago, you start getting a little brain growth. It looks like a little bump there and you’re getting this tool used stuff. So it’s two million years. I think you can sort of zero in on part of it, but if you take this social cultural hypothesis seriously and you look at the tools, it’s really less than a million years. A million years ago, that you get something that looks like a collaborative foraging, collaborative hunting, for example, which I think was a key transition point. And so that’s less than a million years ago, perhaps even a half a million years ago, if you don’t allow groups scavenging and stuff like that. And then so that’s half a million years ago and then maybe 100 to 200,000 years ago, very recently, that’s homo sapiens sapiens. And there’s where you get the idea of really cultural groups and where different groups have different tools and that’s a time where you might expect to see a conventional language And things like that. (Time 0:18:53)
Understanding Theory of Mind in Chimps The speaker discusses the challenge of determining the evolutionary development of a theory of mind in humans, emphasizing the difficulty in pinpointing when it emerged. They express reluctance to use the term ‘theory of mind’ due to differing interpretations, but cite a study showing that chimps do understand the mental and psychological states of others based on their behavior in a food competition scenario. Transcript: Speaker 2 I mean, it does seem like a really hard but important question to say something like the idea, you already mentioned the idea of a theory of mind, the idea that human individuals not only Know things but know what other people know or have opinions about it. Is it even contemplatable to imagine saying, oh, this point in evolutionary history is when we developed a theory of mind. Speaker 1 Well, you know, it doesn’t leave fossils. So no, we don’t. But chimps already know some things. I mean, I try to avoid the word theory of mind just because people mean different things by it. But you know, one of our most highly cited studies, the one that really kind of changed my mind, I originally started out thinking chimps didn’t understand any mental or psychological States of others. But then we did a study where a subordinate chimp and a dominant chimp are competing for food and the subordinate chimp can see some food that the dominant can’t see. It’s on the subordinate side of a barrier, right? (Time 0:21:12)
Understanding Chimpanzee Cognitive Capabilities Chimpanzees have been found to exhibit an understanding of others’ perception and goals, as demonstrated in studies where they differentiate between what is visible to dominant and subordinate chimps, and comprehend others’ goals even when not witnessing the actions. However, this understanding is limited to perception and goals, rather than broader mental states. The research suggests a starting point for cognitive capabilities in great apes, emphasizing continuity without equating it to identity, and highlights the importance of shared perspectives in collaboration. Transcript: Speaker 1 Well, you know, it doesn’t leave fossils. So no, we don’t. But chimps already know some things. I mean, I try to avoid the word theory of mind just because people mean different things by it. But you know, one of our most highly cited studies, the one that really kind of changed my mind, I originally started out thinking chimps didn’t understand any mental or psychological States of others. But then we did a study where a subordinate chimp and a dominant chimp are competing for food and the subordinate chimp can see some food that the dominant can’t see. It’s on the subordinate side of a barrier, right? Okay. So the dominant behaves in ways that show she knows the dominant can’t see it, right? But this is just seeing. This is not sharing thoughts or disagreeing with opinions, all right? We also have studies showing that they understand what others’ goals are. So if they watch somebody else trying to reach a goal and they’re not able to reach the goal, they still know what they were trying to do, even though they didn’t see them do it. All right. So, they have, this is sort of ground zero that I think the great apes all share is an understanding of the perception and goal of other individuals and not the mental states more narrowly Defined. So there’s already a starting point of that. And then that’s why I say, you know, continuity. It’s continuity, but continuity doesn’t mean identity. And so I think that what starts making the difference is when it’s important to me, like if we’re collaborating, it’s important to me that we’re both looking at the antelope over there, But you’re seeing it from one side and I’m seeing it from another. (Time 0:21:35)
The Importance of Coordination in Collaboration and Communication Transcript: Michael Tomasello They have this is sort of ground zero that I think the great apes all share is an understanding of the perception and goals of other individuals and not the mental states more narrowly Defined. So there’s already a starting point of that. And then that’s why I say, you know, continuity, it’s continuity, but continuity doesn’t mean identity. And, and so I think that what starts making the difference is when it’s important to me, like if we’re collaborating, it’s important to me that we’re both looking at the antelope over There, but you’re seeing it from one side, and I’m seeing it from another. And you have one strategy and I have another strategy. And we’ve got to coordinate those. And so one of the things that I’ve argued with children is this hypothesis that I have about putting your heads together. A necessary feature is something like a theory of mind, but to be sufficient, it needs to be coordinating with other people’s minds. And that’s in communication. That’s what right when we’re having a conversation, we’re trying to, you know, I don’t understand you. You have to revise yourself. You say something. I disagree with you. We’re coordinating our minds as we’re communicating. And when we’re collaborating, we’re coordinating not only our actions, but often our decisions. Do you (Time 0:22:40)
The Importance of Coordination in Collaboration and Communication Continuity in collaboration does not mean identical viewpoints, but rather the coordination of different perspectives, strategies, and decisions. In communication, coordinating minds through conversation involves revising and understanding each other’s viewpoints. Collaboration requires not only coordinating actions but also decisions. Coordination problems arise when the same action is needed, illustrating the crucial role of coordination in various aspects of collaboration and communication. Transcript: Speaker 1 So there’s already a starting point of that. And then that’s why I say, you know, continuity. It’s continuity, but continuity doesn’t mean identity. And so I think that what starts making the difference is when it’s important to me, like if we’re collaborating, it’s important to me that we’re both looking at the antelope over there, But you’re seeing it from one side and I’m seeing it from another. And you have one strategy and I have another strategy and we’ve got to coordinate those. And so one of the things that I’ve argued in with children is this hypothesis that I have about putting your heads together, it’s a necessary feature is something like a theory of mind, But to be sufficient, it needs to be coordinating with other people’s minds. And that’s in communication. That’s when we’re having a conversation, we’re trying to, you know, I don’t understand you, you have to revise yourself. You say something I disagree with you. We’re coordinating our minds as we’re communicating. And when we’re collaborating, we’re coordinating not only our actions, but often our decisions. Do you know in game theory, coordination problems? I do, but the audience might not so. So a coordination problem is a problem where we need to do the same thing. (Time 0:22:54)
The Challenge of Coordination Problems Coordination involves not only syncing actions but also decisions. Coordination problems require recursive thinking about what the other person is thinking. This is evident in joint attention, where individuals coordinate their attention to an object and are aware of each other’s attention. The challenge lies in the need to anticipate the other person’s actions and thoughts in a recursive manner. Transcript: Speaker 1 We’re coordinating our minds as we’re communicating. And when we’re collaborating, we’re coordinating not only our actions, but often our decisions. Do you know in game theory, coordination problems? I do, but the audience might not so. So a coordination problem is a problem where we need to do the same thing. Let’s say we’re at a rock concert and it gets out and we get lost from one another and we need to go home together, you know, where are we going to meet? Well, I think, well, okay, where does he think I’m going to go? Well, he thinks I’m going to go where I think he’s going to go. And he thinks I’m going to go where he thinks I’m going to go. So these coordination problems require coordinating and recursively thinking about what he’s thinking about what I’m thinking. And I think what we’ve called joint attention, which you see in young infants already at about a year old, where we’re looking at something together and then the infant looks up at you And then looks down and we’re coordinating our attention to this object, I believe it has a recursive structure that not only am I looking at it, I know you’re looking at it and I know that You know I’m looking at it and you know that I know you know that I’m looking at it. (Time 0:23:55)
Coordination Problems and Joint Attention in Game Theory Transcript: Michael Tomasello Know in game theory, coordination problems? I do, but the audience might not. So a coordination problem is a problem where we need to do the same thing. Let’s say we’re at a rock concert and it gets out and we get lost from one another and we need to go home together. Where are we going to meet? Well, I think, well, okay, where does he think I’m going to go? Well, he thinks I’m going to go where I think he’s going to go. And he thinks I’m going to go where he thinks I’m going to go. So these coordination problems require coordinating and recursively thinking about what he’s thinking about what I’m thinking. And I think what we’ve called joint attention, which you see in young infants already at about a year old, where we’re looking at something together, and then the infant looks up at you And then looks down, and we’re our attention to this object, I believe it has a recursive structure that not only am I looking at it, I know you’re looking at it. And I know that you know I’m looking at it. And you know that I know you know I’m looking at it. So the sharing attention sharing intentions and sharing mental states is about this kind of what to get away from all the recursive embedding. We (Time 0:24:04)
Recursive Coordination and Common Ground Knowledge in Humans Coordinating in situations like getting lost at a concert involves recursive thinking about the other person’s thoughts and intentions. This recursive structure is evident in joint attention observed in young infants. The ability to share attention, intentions, and mental states relies on establishing common ground knowledge, where both parties know that they both know. This level of recursive embedding is not found in chimps and other primates. Transcript: Speaker 1 Let’s say we’re at a rock concert and it gets out and we get lost from one another and we need to go home together, you know, where are we going to meet? Well, I think, well, okay, where does he think I’m going to go? Well, he thinks I’m going to go where I think he’s going to go. And he thinks I’m going to go where he thinks I’m going to go. So these coordination problems require coordinating and recursively thinking about what he’s thinking about what I’m thinking. And I think what we’ve called joint attention, which you see in young infants already at about a year old, where we’re looking at something together and then the infant looks up at you And then looks down and we’re coordinating our attention to this object, I believe it has a recursive structure that not only am I looking at it, I know you’re looking at it and I know that You know I’m looking at it and you know that I know you know that I’m looking at it. So the sharing attention and sharing intentions and sharing mental states is about this kind of what to get away from all the recursive embedding. We just say common ground. We have common ground knowledge. We both know that we both know. And I don’t think chimps and other primates have that. (Time 0:24:17)
Evolution of joint attention and human capacity for shared mental states Infants display joint attention by coordinating attention with others, leading to the development of recursive understanding of shared mental states and common ground knowledge. This capacity for shared attention and intention is unique to humans and differentiates them from primates. This evolutionary development allows humans to coordinate thinking with others, take perspectives, and make their thoughts perspicuous for their partners. Transcript: Speaker 1 And I think what we’ve called joint attention, which you see in young infants already at about a year old, where we’re looking at something together and then the infant looks up at you And then looks down and we’re coordinating our attention to this object, I believe it has a recursive structure that not only am I looking at it, I know you’re looking at it and I know that You know I’m looking at it and you know that I know you know that I’m looking at it. So the sharing attention and sharing intentions and sharing mental states is about this kind of what to get away from all the recursive embedding. We just say common ground. We have common ground knowledge. We both know that we both know. And I don’t think chimps and other primates have that. And I think you once you get that, so again you’re talking about humans as symbol manipulators and reaching a phase transition with a new way of thinking, I believe it evolved to coordinate Your thinking with others. And this taking perspectives and trying to make what you’re thinking perspicuous for your partner. (Time 0:24:47)
Evolution of Cooperative Thinking in Humans Human evolution involves the development of common ground knowledge, symbol manipulation, and the coordination of thinking with others. This evolution may have occurred to facilitate cooperation rather than competition, as humans engage in sharing attention, intentions, and mental states to align thinking and achieve mutual understanding. Transcript: Speaker 1 So the sharing attention and sharing intentions and sharing mental states is about this kind of what to get away from all the recursive embedding. We just say common ground. We have common ground knowledge. We both know that we both know. And I don’t think chimps and other primates have that. And I think you once you get that, so again you’re talking about humans as symbol manipulators and reaching a phase transition with a new way of thinking, I believe it evolved to coordinate Your thinking with others. And this taking perspectives and trying to make what you’re thinking perspicuous for your partner. One of the people who have asked me, couldn’t humans have evolved all this fancy theory of mind, including recursive thinking, in order to compete with others. So I’m wondering what he thinks I’m going to do and what I couldn’t be competing. In theory it could be, but the thing about cooperating is I want you to read my mind. If we’re cooperating, I’m trying to make it, if you and I are going to go do something together, I try to tell you, Sean, here’s what I’m thinking. (Time 0:25:16)
The Evolution of Human Communication and the Role of Language Language is important for communicating thoughts, but it stems from a common social skill. The evolution of human communication suggests that gestures, such as pointing, were the initial step before conventional language symbols. Gestures like pointing and pantomime aided in communicating shared knowledge and collaborative actions before the development of language as a symbol system. Transcript: Speaker 2 And you can see why people would think of language as being so important here. I mean, if you want to communicate to someone else what is in your mind, something pretty intangible from the outside world, the ability to use language is very helpful there. So you’re not denying the importance of language. You’re just saying that it flows out of this common social skill. Absolutely. Speaker 1 And again, the book that I wrote on the evolution of all this, on the evolution of human communication, I say there’s actually a halfway point that shows you that it’s about, that it’s Not language as a conventional symbol system, that’s not the first step. We have gestures that are uniquely human, for example, pointing and iconic gestures or pantomime. So if you and I are whatever wandering around out in the woods and I point like this, okay, what do I mean? Well, you have no idea. I would know context. But let’s say you and I are deciding we’re going to go hunt antelopes and we both know from our past experience, we know in our common ground that we need a spear and we need a wood of a certain Type to make a spear and we’re wandering around and I point over there and you see a piece of wood like that, okay, you can understand that I’m pointing out that piece of wood to you because It’ll make a good spear for us to collaborate together. (Time 0:27:10)
The Evolution of Human Communication and Language The importance of language lies in its ability to communicate what is in one’s mind to others, which is an important social skill. However, the evolution of human communication suggests that language as a conventional symbol system is not the first step. Instead, uniquely human gestures such as pointing, iconic gestures, and pantomime play a crucial role in communication. Transcript: Speaker 2 And you can see why people would think of language as being so important here. I mean, if you want to communicate to someone else what is in your mind, something pretty intangible from the outside world, the ability to use language is very helpful there. So you’re not denying the importance of language. You’re just saying that it flows out of this common social skill. Absolutely. Speaker 1 And again, the book that I wrote on the evolution of all this, on the evolution of human communication, I say there’s actually a halfway point that shows you that it’s about, that it’s Not language as a conventional symbol system, that’s not the first step. We have gestures that are uniquely human, for example, pointing and iconic gestures or pantomime. (Time 0:27:10)
Evolution of Human Communication and Gestures The evolution of human communication suggests that language as a conventional symbol system is not the first step. Uniquely human gestures such as pointing and iconic gestures indicate a halfway point in communication evolution. Pointing depends on common ground and context to convey specific meanings, such as indicating a piece of wood for spear-making or pointing out berries. Transcript: Speaker 1 And again, the book that I wrote on the evolution of all this, on the evolution of human communication, I say there’s actually a halfway point that shows you that it’s about, that it’s Not language as a conventional symbol system, that’s not the first step. We have gestures that are uniquely human, for example, pointing and iconic gestures or pantomime. So if you and I are whatever wandering around out in the woods and I point like this, okay, what do I mean? Well, you have no idea. I would know context. But let’s say you and I are deciding we’re going to go hunt antelopes and we both know from our past experience, we know in our common ground that we need a spear and we need a wood of a certain Type to make a spear and we’re wandering around and I point over there and you see a piece of wood like that, okay, you can understand that I’m pointing out that piece of wood to you because It’ll make a good spear for us to collaborate together. A chimp cannot communicate in that way. Pointing is basically, you gloss pointing as look over there and you’ll know what I mean. And with the same pointing, I can point over there and mean there are some berries, there are some delicious berries. I can mean anything with the pointing but it depends on our common ground. (Time 0:27:31)
The Role of Common Ground in Human Communication Human communication relies on a shared common ground to interpret gestures and language. Pointing and gestures convey meaning that is dependent on what is known in common. Language is considered a symbolic representation and an iconic gesture, which is influenced by shared knowledge. The development of language is seen as a conventionalization of an existing form of communication, rather than a starting point from nothing. Transcript: Speaker 1 And with the same pointing, I can point over there and mean there are some berries, there are some delicious berries. I can mean anything with the pointing but it depends on our common ground. It depends on what we know in common. When you search your search space, like what does he mean when he’s pointing over there? It has to be things that we know in common. I couldn’t be pointing about something I don’t know about and I wouldn’t likely be pointing about something that I knew you didn’t know about. So it’s things that we both know about. So that’s a kind of a halfway house to language is an iconic gestures are symbolic, right? So I say, you know, let’s go, I make a gesture like throwing a spear to say let’s go hunting antelopes where we throw spears. Other apes do not use iconic gestures either and they’re symbolic already. So I’m absolutely, I started my career in developmental psychology with on language. So I’m the last person to say that language is not important. But language is the icing on the cake. It’s the jet rocket at the end. It’s not the starting point. And in fact, there are actually theoretical in principle arguments that you can’t start from nothing and just say, oh, okay, let’s call that a tree. You have to have some, I think you have to have another form of communication and then you conventionalize it into a language. (Time 0:28:47)
The Nature of Communication Through Pointing and Gesture Communication through pointing and gesture relies on common ground between individuals. Pointing can convey different meanings based on shared knowledge and common understanding. Gesture and pointing serve as a precursor to language, with iconic gestures being symbolic and relying on mutual knowledge and understanding. Transcript: Speaker 1 And with the same pointing, I can point over there and mean there are some berries, there are some delicious berries. I can mean anything with the pointing but it depends on our common ground. It depends on what we know in common. When you search your search space, like what does he mean when he’s pointing over there? It has to be things that we know in common. I couldn’t be pointing about something I don’t know about and I wouldn’t likely be pointing about something that I knew you didn’t know about. So it’s things that we both know about. So that’s a kind of a halfway house to language is an iconic gestures are symbolic, right? So I say, you know, let’s go, I make a gesture like throwing a spear to say let’s go hunting antelopes where we throw spears. Other apes do not use iconic gestures either and they’re symbolic already. (Time 0:28:47)
The Importance and Development of Language in Human Cognition Language is critically important for many uniquely human things, and the absence of language would hinder a child on a desert island from achieving fully adult human cognitive capacities. However, the development of language presupposes the existence of other necessary elements. The question of whether there is an innate language capacity, as proposed by Chomsky and Pinker, is subject to critique, with a specific focus on the concept of a generative grammar instinct. Transcript: Speaker 1 And in fact, there are actually theoretical in principle arguments that you can’t start from nothing and just say, oh, okay, let’s call that a tree. You have to have some, I think you have to have another form of communication and then you conventionalize it into a language. And now you’ve got these conventional symbols and so forth. So anyway, so yes, I think language is critically important for many uniquely human things. And that’s why our child on the desert island, one of the main reasons that he or she wouldn’t get to fully adult human cognitive capacities is because they don’t have language. But it presupposes a lot of other things. And if you want to say what makes humans different is language, then you’ve got to go back and account for those other things that make it possible. And where would you stand on the question of whether or not there is an innate language capacity, sort of no Chomsky, Stephen Pinker, point of view? I wrote a critique, I wrote a bunch of critiques of it, but Pinker’s book The Language Instinct, which was such a sensation. I just said, really, if you want to really understand, you have to be a little more precise. He’s really saying a generative grammar instinct. He’s saying Chomsky’s theory is an instinct. And that’s what I disagree with. Okay. (Time 0:29:57)
Biological Evolution and Linguistic Diversity Humans are biologically evolved to use language and have cognitive capacities to form concepts and communicate, including non-linguistic means like pointing and pantomiming. While humans are prepared to imitate and internalize language, linguistic diversity is evident in the differences in grammatical structures across different languages. Transcript: Speaker 1 And that’s what I disagree with. Okay. All right, of course, we are biologically prepared, biologically evolved to use a language. There’s no question. But I believe we’re evolved to have certain cognitive capacities to form concepts to communicate, like for example, with pointing and pantomiming, which is not linguistic. So that form of communicative intentions and reading people’s recruitment, good intentions and recursive thinking and all that. So we’re prepared in all those ways, we’re prepared to imitate other people when they use a piece of language. We’re prepared to internalize the language and use it in our own individual thinking. But Chomsky’s proposal was about generative grammar. It was about syntax. All right. And the Institute, I was at in Leibzig, Germany for many years. We had a linguistics department that was focused on cross-linguistic studies. And yes, there are a lot of commonalities in the languages of the world with regard to again the use of concepts and communicative intentions and certain principles of pragmatics of Communication and certain principles. But the actual grammatical structures are quite different in different languages. (Time 0:31:20)
Critique of high church evolutionary psychology The speaker discusses the term ‘evolutionary psychology’ and its association with a specific viewpoint characterized as high church evolutionary psychology. The speaker identifies key characteristics of this viewpoint, including its focus on innate and modular aspects, particularly influenced by the work of Chomsky. However, the speaker critiques this narrow focus, acknowledging the value in areas such as mate choice, but expressing skepticism about applying the innate modularity concept to broader aspects like language and culture. Transcript: Speaker 1 Okay. Sometimes people call it evolutionary psychology with a capital E and a capital P. I’ve also called it, I’ve heard it called high church evolutionary psychology. When I started my department at the Institute in Leibzig, I thought of the name evolutionary psychology, but it was already taken by a very particular view. So what people call evolutionary psychology, I am an evolutionary psychologist by the any normal meaning of those terms, but the to be in Cosmede’s version of it has some special characteristics. And from the beginning, they started in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where Chomsky is and they have this Chomsky was about languages, a module and it’s innate and it’s modular. And so they took this idea of innate and modular and tried to see everything through those lenses. And I just find it a little bit narrow. I don’t find it wrong. A lot of their stuff is really fascinating and really interesting, but when you focus on something like mate choice, okay, I’m all in. There’s something that’s really evolutionarily important, obviously, is who you mate with and who you find attractive and who you mate with and all that can easily be a little specialized Module. I don’t have any problem with that. But things like language and culture and all those things, they just don’t fit the sort of innate modularity kind of idea. (Time 0:33:45)
Psicología evolucionista clásica analiza modularmente adaptaciones evolutivas. Transcript: Michael Tomasello To think about complicated species like apes and humans. You have to think about them as organized cognitively, hierarchically. So I’m positing that at some point humans needed to collaborate with one another to get their food. What do you have to do to be a good collaborator? Oh, and sorry, it’s important that also there’s partner choice. That is, partners choose who to collaborate with, right? So what do I have to do to be a good collaborator? Well, I could talk about that for about an hour, right? So I have to have certain cognitive capacities. I have to have certain communicative capacities because I’m going to coordinate with my partner. I have to have certain moral capacities because I’m going to share the spoils when I really want to take it all myself. I’m going to share the spoils. Evolved for this task that is directing my evolution, that is selecting me, and including the social part. So I have to be concerned about my reputation. I have to be concerned about how other people view me as a cooperator. That means taking their perspective. So all of these things, I’m sure you could get down to somewhere where you could call one of them an innate module. But they’re part of a larger organizational thing that Tubian Cosmetes like to zero in on the more things lower on the hierarchy, that is on the communication I might do or on the negotiation I might do to share the spoils or something like that. So when you say I’m looking for the one big thing, I just think that humans are like great apes in so many ways. I don’t think that in that last million years that we have separate adaptations for forming social institutions, another adaptation for language, another adaptation for theory Of mind, another adaptation for mathematics, another adaptation. I think it’s more plausible if the timeframe you’re talking about is just a million years or even two, is that we had this, yes, one of the things that Tubi and Cosmedes stressed that was Really important in psychology and that I promote every chance I get, people will say things like, people who are not very evolutionarily minded, a lot of psychologists included, Will say things like, humans evolved to be smarter and to have bigger brains. And Tubi and Cosmetes argue really forcefully and really convincingly that evolution doesn’t work like that. You have to have a specific problem. You have to have a specific problem. And so (Time 0:36:21)
adaptación crítica evolución homo_sapiens
Evolutionary Pressures and Human Behavior Humans are influenced by various factors in their behavior, such as concern for reputation, perspective-taking, cooperation, communication, and negotiation. While these factors may seem like innate modules, they are part of a larger organizational framework. This suggests that humans, like great apes, have not developed separate adaptations for social institutions, language, theory of mind, and mathematics in the last million years. Transcript: Speaker 1 I have to have all kinds of things for this task that is directing my evolution, that is selecting me and including the social part. So I have to be concerned about my reputation. I have to be concerned about how other people view me as a co-operator. That means taking their perspective. So all of these things, I’m sure you could get down to somewhere where you could call one of them an innate module. But they’re part of a larger organizational thing. And to be in Cosmetes like to zero in on the more things lower on the hierarchy that is on the communication I might do or on the negotiation I might do to share the spoils or something like That. But when you say I’m looking for the one big thing, I just think that humans are like great apes in so many ways. I don’t think that in that last million years that we have separate adaptations for forming social institutions, another adaptation for language, another adaptation for theory Of mind, another adaptation for mathematics, another adaptation. (Time 0:37:11)
The Evolutionary Benefits of Specific Problems Human behavior should be viewed as hierarchical and focused on solving specific problems which can have multiple sub-problems. Evolutionary pressure is not to make brains bigger but to solve specific problems such as collaborating to get food, which brings about cognitive, communicative, and socio-moral challenges. The benefit of having big brains should be specific, not vague like the ability to have podcasts in the future. Transcript: Speaker 1 You have to have a specific problem. You have to have a specific problem. And so they focus on very concrete problems, mate choice or whatever it might be. And what I want to say is you have to think about human behavior as hierarchical and if what’s being, I want to say what’s being, I’m agreeing with them and I learn from them, we have a problem. And the problem is collaborating to get food. It’s just that that problem has about 50 sub problems that it brings with it. And they are both cognitive problems, communicative problems, socio-moral problems, all kinds of things that go with it. So I wouldn’t stress that it’s not that they have a lot of little things and I have one big thing. I have one big thing that I think organizes a lot of little things. Speaker 2 Okay, that makes a lot of sense. And I like the point that we’re not, the evolutionary pressure is not to make our brains bigger. If anything, it’s the other way around. Big brains are very expensive. So there has to be some benefit of having them and the benefit should be specific, not that someday we’ll have podcasts. Speaker 1 And in addition, another, I know that a lot of people, you seem to be (Time 0:39:15)
The evolutionary advantage of big brains and human learning compared to great apes Evolutionary pressure does not drive the enlargement of human brains because large brains are costly, so there must be specific benefits. One concrete benefit is the extended period of learning and support for human youngsters, in contrast to great apes who are independent at a young age. Transcript: Speaker 2 Okay, that makes a lot of sense. And I like the point that we’re not, the evolutionary pressure is not to make our brains bigger. If anything, it’s the other way around. Big brains are very expensive. So there has to be some benefit of having them and the benefit should be specific, not that someday we’ll have podcasts. Speaker 1 And in addition, another, I know that a lot of people, you seem to be a more broad-minded physicist than most, but I know a lot of people who are more in the physical sciences and hardcore, This psychology stuff and theory, minus stuff, it all seems very airy and everything. But another concrete thing you can point to is how much longer humans on toggene is than others. So great apes, as soon as they wean at about age three or four, they’re on their own. And they’re getting their food on their own and nobody’s teaching them anything. So there’s no teaching. So they’re basically independent agents on their own. Humans, they’re studies with hunter-gatherer groups that youngsters don’t bring in more calories than they consume until they’re 16 years old or something. (Time 0:40:13)
The Evolutionary Significance of Long Human Dependency Period The extended period of dependency in human youngsters, compared to hunter-gatherer groups, has implications for both the children’s safety and the parents’ productivity. Despite the costs and risks involved in this long dependency, it serves the purpose of providing time for learning, social coordination, and cultural integration. Transcript: Speaker 1 Humans, they’re studies with hunter-gatherer groups that youngsters don’t bring in more calories than they consume until they’re 16 years old or something. And in the modern world. It’s longer than that now. Our kids still have the credit card in their mid-20s. Have the parents credit card in the mid-20s. So this long dependency has a lot of, you were saying the big brain has a lot of costs. It must be doing something. This long dependency is both dangerous for children. They’re not able to defend themselves from predators or feed themselves for over a decade. It’s costly for the parents because the parents are investing in the kids when they could be doing something more directly productive for themselves. And when I watched chimps in Africa, I just did a month of field work one time. But if a predator is nearby, moms are typically have two youngsters hanging off of them. And when you’re scrambling, having two youngsters hanging off of you and trying to get away from a leopard, that’s not good. So this long ontogeny is costly and risky. So it must be doing something. And what it’s doing is it’s giving time to learn and to socially coordinate and to become a member of a culture. (Time 0:41:16)
The impact of accumulated knowledge on human survival and development Accumulated knowledge allows people to survive in extreme environments and this knowledge is culturally transmitted over time. The lengthy time it takes for young individuals to learn and the need for parental protection during this time suggests a different psychological orientation. The development of morality and social skills is linked to this process, as cooperation and altruism pose a challenge for evolutionary theory. Transcript: Speaker 1 And it’s because, but you couldn’t do it yourself. If somebody dropped you or me in the Arctic, we’d last 20 minutes. So or if they dropped us in the middle of the jungle. So the people can live in these places because they accumulate knowledge and information about these specific locations and transmit it culturally over time. So the long ontogeny is clearly built on the fact that youngsters need a long time to learn stuff and they need to be protected by their parents for a long time to get that done very costly. So again, that’s a concrete thing you can point to in physical development, as it were, that is suggestive of a different kind of psychological orientation. Speaker 2 And you mentioned morality a couple of times. And I know that you have a whole other book on the origin of morality. And I’m going to guess that it fits in very well with this sort of social skill development story. Speaker 1 Yes. Yeah. Well, so all the way back to Darwin, people have recognized that being cooperative, being nice to others, altruistic is a problem for Darwin’s theory. There’s a famous quip that in evolutionary (Time 0:43:01)
Evolutionary Perspective on Altruism and Cooperation Altruism and cooperation have been considered problematic for Darwin’s theory of evolution, as individuals are expected to prioritize their own survival and reproduction. However, cooperation can lead to a win-win situation, which is often overlooked. This challenges the traditional belief that altruism cannot evolve, as it can contribute to the future gene pool through cooperation. Transcript: Speaker 2 And you mentioned morality a couple of times. And I know that you have a whole other book on the origin of morality. And I’m going to guess that it fits in very well with this sort of social skill development story. Speaker 1 Yes. Yeah. Well, so all the way back to Darwin, people have recognized that being cooperative, being nice to others, altruistic is a problem for Darwin’s theory. There’s a famous quip that in evolutionary biology, the definition of altruism is that which cannot evolve. Because the individual, if I want to be a really nice guy and give away all the food and all the resources that I gather, then I’m not going to be leaving any children. So I’m not going to be contributing to the future gene pool. So Darwin got it right. Everybody, all the individuals have to be looking out for themselves. But cooperation can be a win-win situation, which there are a lot of people that don’t understand this. (Time 0:43:50)
The Evolutionary Paradox of Altruism and Morality Darwin’s theory initially posed a challenge to the idea of altruism, as giving away resources could hinder an individual’s ability to pass on their genes. However, a minority voice in evolutionary theory suggests that cooperation can be a win-win situation. Morality is seen as a human version of cooperation, defined by sacrificing, fairness, and considering others’ concerns while ensuring the individual’s survival. Thus, morality is a delicate balance between self-preservation and consideration for others. Transcript: Speaker 1 Yes. Yeah. Well, so all the way back to Darwin, people have recognized that being cooperative, being nice to others, altruistic is a problem for Darwin’s theory. There’s a famous quip that in evolutionary biology, the definition of altruism is that which cannot evolve. Because the individual, if I want to be a really nice guy and give away all the food and all the resources that I gather, then I’m not going to be leaving any children. So I’m not going to be contributing to the future gene pool. So Darwin got it right. Everybody, all the individuals have to be looking out for themselves. But cooperation can be a win-win situation, which there are a lot of people that don’t understand this. There are a lot of people who think it’s a zero sum game, but there’s another minority voice that’s been in evolutionary theory all along that cooperation can be a win-win situation. And morality is, I define as the human version of cooperation. It’s a special version of cooperation. It’s a psychology built for cooperation, right? Because I’m sacrificing for you. I’m being fair and dividing those resources to include you and have your concerns equal to my concerns and those kinds of things. But to make it work, it has to not disadvantage the individual out of existence. That’s the key. So morality is the balancing act between me keeping my concerns in mind enough to survive and keeping your concerns in mind. (Time 0:44:03)
The Nature of Cooperation and Morality Cooperation is a form of psychology based on sacrifice, fairness, and resource-sharing to ensure mutual concerns are addressed without disadvantaging any individual. Morality is the balance between self-preservation and considering others’ concerns, underpinned by the key concept of interdependence. This interdependence can be likened to symbiotic relationships in evolutionary biology, where actions are done for mutual benefit within the same species. Transcript: Speaker 1 It’s a special version of cooperation. It’s a psychology built for cooperation, right? Because I’m sacrificing for you. I’m being fair and dividing those resources to include you and have your concerns equal to my concerns and those kinds of things. But to make it work, it has to not disadvantage the individual out of existence. That’s the key. So morality is the balancing act between me keeping my concerns in mind enough to survive and keeping your concerns in mind. And the key concept, so this is for people who are hardcore evolutionists, this is the key concept. The key concept is interdependence. One way you can think about it is symbiosis. You have symbiotic relationships between two species. Both of them are getting something out of it. That’s the whole definition of it. Well, in evolutionary biology, symbiosis is used between species. I’m not sure why it’s restricted that way. I just want to generalize it within the species. That is, I can do stuff for you that you need and you do stuff for me that I need. (Time 0:45:17)
Interdependence in social networks and genetic fitness Living in an interdependent social network leads individuals to help each other because of their dependence on one another. The Kinn selection theory explains that individuals help others who share their genes to promote their own genetic fitness. Transcript: Speaker 1 If you assume that they’re living in an interdependent social network where they depend on one another, then they’re helping one another because they depend on one another. There’s a very simple mathematics to it, a guy named Gilbert Roberts. Again, I don’t know exactly your background, but do you know the Hamilton-Kinn selection? Speaker 2 Again, I do, but let’s not assume that the audience does. Speaker 1 The Kinn selection is that my children share my genes and my brother shares my genes. Those in my interest for my genetic fitness that I help them to a certain degree. (Time 0:48:15)
The Key Elements of Evolution: Food and Interdependence In evolution, food and mating are crucial elements. Primates, particularly great apes, spend a significant amount of time foraging for fruits, as these only provide energy for a few hours. Humans have developed a immediate and urgent interdependence in getting food, where collaboration is necessary. However, collaboration may be hindered if one does not share the food fairly with others. Transcript: Speaker 1 We start with that kind of interdependence, but then some species have more interdependencies than others. Nothing is more important than getting food. Food and mating, those are the key elements in evolution. But food, you’ve got to do it every few hours, every day. If you look at chimps in the wild, they’re wandering around foraging for food. That’s what they do all day. Maybe they made on the side and they have a fight on the side and they groom on the side, but where they go and what they do is all aimed at getting food. Primates in particular, a lot of them and great apes, they eat fruits. The fruits only give you energy for a few hours and then you’ve got to eat some more. If humans became interdependent with one another in getting food to a degree that other primates did not, and this becomes immediate and urgent interdependence, I’m ready to go out And get some food. The only kind I can get is one where I can get collaboratively or the only good kind, certainly the only meat. Nobody will collaborate with me. Okay? What am I going to do? Why won’t they collaborate with me? Because I don’t share at the end. If we get something, I grab it all myself and I don’t let them have any. (Time 0:51:35)
Evolution of morality based on interdependent cooperation The evolution of morality is rooted in interdependent cooperation, where individuals have to treat each other fairly and with respect due to the understanding that they rely on each other as partners. This cooperation is not just about being nice, but about the cognitive and rational process of fairness. The concept of fairness involves the idea of dividing resources equally and is a fundamental aspect of the evolution of morality, alongside sharing, helping, and sympathy. Transcript: Speaker 1 If we get something, I grab it all myself and I don’t let them have any. Everybody selects against me. They don’t choose me as a partner and I’m a goner. That’s the context for the evolution of morality is this interdependence cooperation, not cooperation on just being nice, but this interdependent cooperation where we have to treat One another fairly. We have to treat one another with respect. In the sense that I know that you don’t have to cooperate with me. You have some other choices. Not only that, but I know that you need me too to some degree. Maybe you have some other choices also, but I know if we’re good partners, you depend on me and I depend on you. I have a little leverage here too. What’s the solution? The solution is, well, okay, let’s divide it equally. Let’s be fair about it. I do think that in the book on morality, I distinguish that goes all the way back to the ancient Greeks, the morality of sharing and helping and sympathy and the morality of fairness, Which is a more cognitive, rational kind of process. The morality of sympathy, that’s where Franz Duwall has focused most of his attention. I believe is all mammals have some of it. (Time 0:52:58)
The Morality of Sympathy and Fairness The morality of sympathy, involving sharing, helping, and sacrifice, is apparent in mammals, with examples seen in oxytocin-mediated maternal behavior and rats helping each other. This morality likely evolved from genetic kin selection and has been generalized to non-kin. Additionally, fairness and obligation play a role in morality, with individuals feeling obligated to reciprocate help or share in the benefits of cooperation. Transcript: Speaker 1 I do think that in the book on morality, I distinguish that goes all the way back to the ancient Greeks, the morality of sharing and helping and sympathy and the morality of fairness, Which is a more cognitive, rational kind of process. The morality of sympathy, that’s where Franz Duwall has focused most of his attention. I believe is all mammals have some of it. They have their oxytocin and the mothers are sacrificing for offspring all the time. Some species generalize it. You may have seen some of the stuff about rats helping other rats escape from cages and stuff. They already have the mechanism for sacrificing for their offspring and that’s probably evolved with genetic out of kin selection. But then they just have to generalize the mechanism to non-kin. I think actually the sort of helping and sympathy is widespread in mammals. It’s just a matter of how widely do they use it. The morality of fairness and obligation. I have an obligation. You helped me last time. I have an obligation to help you this time. We worked equally hard at this foraging problem. (Time 0:53:47)
The Evolution of Agency and Evolved Behavior The concept of agency in the context of evolution refers to the ability of organisms to make decisions that cannot be solely determined by their genetic programming. This is illustrated by the evolved behavior of squirrels in caching nuts for the winter, which demonstrates a level of decision-making beyond deterministic control. The speaker emphasizes that as organisms become more complex, nature builds in a lot of flexibility, allowing for behaviors that are not entirely determined by genetic programming. Transcript: Speaker 1 The Evolution of Agency. I think it says behavioral organization from lizards to humans. I can never remember my subtitles because they always change in the production process. I wanted to get lizards in there or something like that because I wanted to convey to people who know my other books that I’m going a little bit farther back in evolution than I have previously. What do you mean by agency in this context? Let me just give you an example that’s on page one of the book. Squirrels cache nuts. They hide them away and store them for winter and go get them later. That’s clearly an evolved behavior. All squirrels do it, the world over, this is part of squirrel evolved psychology. If you look at a particular squirrel at a particular moment with a nut and he’s trying to decide where to cache it in this landscape, I’m saying that evolution cannot, in principle, tell Them what to do. It can’t be determined like that. In general, what evolution has done, and it may be that you can think of these very simple creature, one-celled organisms and very simple creatures, it may be that you can think of them In deterministic way, I don’t know. But creatures that are a little more complicated, what nature has done is said, okay, I’m going to build you in with a lot of stuff here. (Time 0:57:14)
Evolution of agency and informed decision making Nature has equipped more complex creatures with the capacity to make decisions in unpredictable situations. It has built in the ability to learn, gather information, and make informed decisions based on individual circumstances, such as finding a watering hole. This capability for agency and informed decision making is essential for dealing with unpredictabilities in the environment. Transcript: Speaker 1 But creatures that are a little more complicated, what nature has done is said, okay, I’m going to build you in with a lot of stuff here. But then when it comes down to actually making a decision about what to do in a particular situation, I’m going to leave it up to you because I can’t predict. I don’t know exactly where the watering hole is in the place you’re born. Nature doesn’t know that ahead of time. The watering holes change. So I’m going to build you with the capacity to learn where your watering hole is and to decide when and how to go there and stuff like that. So agency is about the agency evolves when there are unpredictabilities and nature builds in an apparatus for the individual to deal with those unpredictabilities through what I Call informed decision making. That is, looking around gathering information and making the best decision. That decision is on a particular occasion is not determined by mother nature. What’s determined is the decision making apparatus that you go to it with. And so you need an agent. (Time 0:58:37)
The Role of Informed Decision Making in Dealing with Unpredictabilities Nature presents unpredictabilities, leading individuals to develop an apparatus for informed decision making. This decision making apparatus is independent of specific outcomes and is essential for navigating unforeseen circumstances. The concept of control systems from cybernetics further illustrates the necessity of perceiving the world and having a goal state in dealing with unpredictable situations. Transcript: Speaker 1 Unpredictabilities and nature builds in an apparatus for the individual to deal with those unpredictabilities through what I call informed decision making. That is, looking around gathering information and making the best decision. That decision is on a particular occasion is not determined by mother nature. What’s determined is the decision making apparatus that you go to it with. And so you need an agent. Now a lot of people say, oh gosh, that sounds like a whole monculous to me, right? But this is why in that book, I start out with control systems. So I think that, and this goes back to the cybernetics, to Ross Ashby and Norbert Weener and people like that, they build these machines and do this theory showing that if you have a problem Where you need a machine that can act autonomously from individuals, from humans and intelligently, it has only one possible structure. And that is, it has to perceive the world, it has to have a goal state that it wants to be the case in the environment, (Time 0:59:22)
The concept of agency and individual decision-making The concept of agency involves an organism making decisions to meet its goals, involving the gathering of information and decision-making. This concept is essential in psychology as it emphasizes individual decision-making and the assessment of situations to meet goals. However, in the field of animal behavior, there is still a dominant behavioristic view that focuses on stimulus-response relationships, which contrasts the concept of agency. Transcript: Speaker 1 The agent is the organism acting with this kind of cognitive organization that I gather in, you know, I have a goal, I gather information, I decide what needs to be due to meet the goal And so forth. So that’s what the agency is. It’s about the, and I would say that people who want to say that everything is deterministic in the world, you know, the Laplacian starting state and everything is determined, they Just don’t want psychology in the picture. I want to say that if you want psychology in the picture, you have to have an individual making decisions. And if you don’t, then it’s fine, but it’s all physics or it’s all biology. And I’m a psychologist and I want psychology and the psychology means I have an individual who’s assessing the situation and deciding what to do to meet its goals. So people kind of, that’s, I don’t think, I mean, it is controversial to some people, but I would say most psychology kind of operates with that as a kind of an assumption. But in the field of animal behavior, and I actually wrote the book on agency for people in animal behavior, there’s still a lot of kind of, um, behavioristic talk like stimulus in response, The organism is responding to a stimulus. Well, that’s a kind of a classic physicalistic cause leads to effect, stimulus leads to response. (Time 1:03:27)
Agencia o intencionalidad compartida como rasgo característico del homo sapiens. Transcript: Michael Tomasello The shared intentionality is that humans have evolved to be shared agents or social agents or plural agents. All these are words different people have used. And when you and I decide to solve a problem, when you and I are going hunting together collaboratively, we have a shared goal. We have a joint goal. We have shared knowledge about the situation and we communicate to make sure we have shared knowledge. And we kind of self-regulate it together. So I say, Hey, hey, go over there and don’t do this. You say, Oh, don’t do that. Do this, you know? And so we’re kind of regulating it. So we kind of make a shared agent and I’ve (Time 1:06:12)
agencia homo_sapiens intencionalidad
agencia intencionalidad homo_sapiens
The Influence of Increasing Complexity on Different Levels of Agency The speaker discusses the concept of increasing complexity leading to different kinds of agency and experiences, and suggests that as an evolutionist, one must consider the perspective of different organisms and their mental relationship to reality. Transcript: Speaker 2 So maybe to finally wrap things up, leading from the different levels of agency, you have sort of a provocative thought in the book about increasing complexity along this chain that Leads to not only different kinds of agency, but different kinds of experience, you know, different kinds of, I don’t know, you know, mental relationship to reality. Speaker 1 Well, this is a very long and difficult topic, Sean, that I’m in a clear minority on. But I believe if you are an evolutionist, you have to, you know, what is the world? Do you know von Uchscholl at all? He was a classic. Anyway, what is the world for a worm? You know, what is the world for a tick? I don’t know. I think that’s a good question. Von Uchscholl has a big thing about ticks because he had studied ticks, you know, (Time 1:15:46)